We introduce a post-entry liquidity constraint to the standard model of a …rm with serially correlated pro…tability and an irreversible exit decision. We assume that …rms with no cash holdings and negative cash ‡ow must either exit or raise new cash at a transaction cost. This creates a precautionary motive for holding cash, which must be traded o¤ against the liquidity cost of holding cash. We characterize the optimal exit and payout policy. The direct e¤ect of …nancial frictions is to impose ine¢ cient exit, but there is also an indirect e¤ect through higher equilibrium price which leads to ine¢ cient survival. (D81, D92,
Introduction
We analyze how …nancial frictions a¤ect the optimal policy and survival prospects of a …rm that operates under persistent cash ‡ow uncertainty. The persistence in pro…tability implies that a …rm should exit if the current cash ‡ow falls su¢ ciently low. Financial frictions imply that a …rm may also exit due to insu¢ cient liquidity even when continuation would be economically e¢ cient. Our model captures the interaction of these two dimensions-pro…tability and liquidity-underlying …rm exit, and shows how the …rm should optimally manage its cash reserves to cope with the liquidity constraint. The solution is a policy for exit and payouts that depends on the current levels of both pro…tability and cash holdings. We also analyze the associated steady state distribution of …rms in a competitive industry, and show how it can involve either too much or too little exit, the latter case being a type of "survival of the fattest."
Our starting point is a standard real option model of a …rm with serially correlated pro…tability and an irreversible exit decision.
1 In this setup the potential for future pro…ts and the irreversibility of exit make it optimal for a …rm to continue even when facing expected losses. Cash holdings are irrelevant in the absence of …nancial constraints and the optimal policy is simply a negative threshold level of pro…tability below which the …rm exits. The optimal exit policy thus requires the ability to sustain negative cash ‡ows inde…nitely. It seems realistic in many contexts that a …rm with a long history of losses would …nd it di¢ cult to keep raising more funds. But as soon as there is a limit to a …rm's ability to sustain losses the …rm's problem changes in a fundamental way.
In our basic case we model the liquidity constraint as the complete inability to raise new funds. The …rm has an initial stock of cash that can only be augmented with retained earnings. A …rm without cash and with a negative cash ‡ow is forced to exit immediately regardless of its future prospects, so …rms have an incentive to hoard cash in order to avoid ine¢ cient exit in the future. This precautionary saving is costly due to the liquidity premium: cash holdings earn interest at a rate below the discount rate.
Therefore, if the …rm is su¢ ciently safe from forced exit-with a su¢ ciently benign combination of cash ‡ow and cash holdings-it is strictly optimal to pay out some of the cash to the owners. Thus, besides a¤ecting the optimal exit policy, the model 1 See e.g. Chapter 7 in Dixit and Pindyck (1994) .
1 also generates the optimal dividend policy. At the same time, if the …rm is currently unpro…table and the remaining cash holdings are relatively small, it can be optimal to pay out the remaining cash and close down operations rather than run the risk of forced exit later on. We call this feature of the optimal policy "precautionary exit."
We characterize the optimal policy and analyze its dependence on the properties of the cash ‡ow process. Our model leads to a free boundary partial di¤erential equation problem that does not have an analytical solution. Instead of attempting to solve the …rm's problem directly we formulate it as a recursive dynamic programming problem and show how it can be easily solved by value function iteration. The solution has an intuitive interpretation and we illustrate its comparative statics properties graphically.
Our numerical results show that even a small liquidity premium has a large impact on optimal …rm behavior.
We do not explicitly model the causes behind the liquidity constraint. One natural cause is asymmetric information: it can be di¢ cult for a …rm or a manager to credibly convey to investors the potential for pro…ts. 2 Aside from the liquidity constraint, our model has no other imperfections such as agency problems.
The literal interpretation of the decision-maker in our basic model is a risk neutral owner-entrepreneur who can increase cash holdings only through retained earnings.
Nevertheless, we believe our …ndings have relevance in the wider context. In an extension we show that our results are robust to allowing the owners to raise new funds at a transaction cost; in e¤ect the basic model assumes that this cost is prohibitive.
We also analyze the impact of the liquidity constraint at the level of an industry. Our concept of competitive industry equilibrium with entry and exit of …rms is essentially that of Hopenhayn (1992) , and we assume that the uncertainty faced by individual …rms is due to idiosyncratic productivity shocks. In this setup the liquidity constraint causes an obvious overselectivity e¤ect in terms of productivity: some marginally productive …rms that should survive a temporary loss exit due to insu¢ cient funds (or, more accurately, in order to preempt forced exit). This e¤ect tends to make the remaining industry on average more productive by weeding out marginally 2 For evidence on the importance of liquidity constraints for …rms, see, for example, Evans and Jovanovic (1989) , Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian and Rosen (1994) , and Zingales (1998) . There is also a literature on endogenous borrowing constraints, e.g., Albuquerque and Hopenhayn (2004) , and DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006) . Holmström and Tirole (2011, esp . Chapters 1-2) discuss why agency problems may cause a …rm to face a liquidity constraint.
productive …rms that would need …nancing to survive. However, the liquidity constraint also induces some formerly productive …rms with su¢ cient cash holdings to stay on even when their productivity falls below the socially e¢ cient exit threshold. This is a type of "survival of the fattest" as coined by Zingales (1998) . As a result of these counteracting e¤ects, the liquidity constraint may either reduce or increase the average productivity of …rms. In a calibrated example, we …nd that the former e¤ect dominates as the liquidity constraint increases average productivity by 3:6%.
The welfare loss due to the liquidity constraint shows up as a consumer price that is higher by 7:3%.
Related literature
Our model builds on elements from the literature on the optimal exercise of options, where the seminal papers are by McDonald and Siegel (1986) , who model the optimal timing of investment under uncertain cash ‡ow, and by Dixit (1989) , who analyzes the …rm's optimal entry and exit decisions in the same framework. A large number of extensions to various directions is summarized by Dixit and Pindyck (1994) . Our paper extends this line of research to another direction by adding a liquidity constraint that may prevent the …rm from covering operating losses.
One paper that addresses the e¤ects of liquidity constraints on the optimal exercise of real options is by Boyle and Guthrie (2003) , who analyze the optimal timing of investment when uncertain wealth prior to the investment a¤ects the …rm's ability to …nance the investment. Our paper, by contrast, focuses on post-investment uncertainty and its e¤ects on optimal payouts and exit.
A special case of our model, where we assume away the liquidity premium, bears close resemblance to the problem of a …nancially constrained …rm in Mello and Parsons (2000) , who analyze the optimal hedging policy for a …rm that faces persistent cash ‡ow risk and cannot raise new funds. Gryglewicz (2011) presents a model of a …nancially constrained start-up …rm, where the mean level of a stochastic cash ‡ow is learned over time. Eventually, as …rms mature, they either go bankrupt, or their con…dence of being high type converges to certainty, in which case they face only i.i.d.
risk and their cash holdings increase without limit. In these models the …rm has to choose the optimal exit policy, but it has no reason to ever pay out dividends.
It is important to make a clear distinction between our model and an ostensibly Radner and Shepp (1996) and Dutta and Radner (1999) add an operation policy that controls risk-return properties of the earnings process, Décamps and Villeneuve (2007) analyze the optimal exercise of a growth option, Peura and Keppo (2006) introduce a delay time to recapitalization, and Rochet and Villeneuve (2005) allow ‡exible allocation of reserves in risky and safe alternatives. Décamps, Mariotti, Rochet, and Villeneuve (2011) assume costly recapitalization, and analyze the implications of such …nancing frictions on the …rm's cash management and stock price dynamics.
The attraction of modeling the level of pro…ts as a memoryless process is that it results in one-dimensional state-space, which yields analytical solutions. The drawback is that the liquidity constraint is then the only reason why the …rm would ever exit, because the future always looks equally pro…table. This is reasonable for a …rm that consists of …nancial assets whose prices react to news in an e¢ cient market but is less suited as a model of a …rm facing uncertainty over real (non-…nancial) operations.
In our setup, the …rm's pro…tability (the level of expected pro…t ‡ow) ‡uctuates, making entry and exit natural features of the economy irrespective of whether there are liquidity constraints or not. Having a …rst-best benchmark that involves …rm exit allows us to analyze how the liquidity constraint a¤ects …rm survival, and how, at industry level, it impacts …rm selection.
There are also a few papers on the macroeconomic e¤ects of …nancial frictions that are related to ours. Cooley and Quadrini (2001) , Gomes (2001), and Jones (2003) use as building blocks models of …rm dynamics with serially correlated productivity.
In Gomes's and Jones's papers …rms also face an exit decision, and in the latter paper the …nancial constraint may force the …rm to exit in states where it would be socially e¢ cient to continue. However, due to di¤erent focus, none of these papers 4 characterize the joint exit-payout policy of the …rm.
Our setup is also related to the models of precautionary saving. The seminal papers on precautionary saving by Zeldes (1989) and Deaton (1991) analyze the problem of optimal lifetime consumption. Under serially correlated income shocks the state space is two-dimensional (savings and expected income) as in our model; the key di¤erence is that consumers do not face an exit decision. For consumers, precautionary saving results from the convexity of marginal utility, whereas in our model it results from the threat of forced exit.
Next we characterize the problem of the …rm. We begin with the basic model, where the …rm cannot raise outside funds, and then add the possibility of raising cash at a transaction cost. In section 3 we solve the …rm's optimal policy. In section 4
we analyze the implications of the liquidity constraint for a competitive industry and present a calibrated example.
The Problem of the Firm
The …rm faces a stochastic revenue ‡ow x t that follows geometric Brownian motion
where dw t is the increment of a standardized Wiener process (i.e., with mean zero and variance dt). The …rm earns a pro…t ‡ow t = x t c where the …xed cost c is a positive constant. Exit is irreversible and without an additional exit cost or scrap value. (The entry decision will only show up in industry equilibrium.) The objective is to maximize the expected present value of the income to the owners, discounted at rate > .
There are two fundamentally di¤erent cases. An unconstrained …rm can accumulate negative pro…ts inde…nitely if needed. The problem of an unconstrained …rm is described by the standard real option model of optimal exit. The sole decision is to choose the exit threshold for x t , so there is no meaningful decision for when (if at all) to retain cash or pay dividends.
A constrained …rm has to worry about its ability to cover negative pro…ts using its existing cash reserves. The optimal exit policy depends both on revenue x t and cash holdings s t . The …rm's cash holdings are augmented by the pro…t ‡ow and by the interest earned on the cash holdings at an exogenous rate r . The di¤erence 5 r is the liquidity premium. If r < then the cash held inside the …rm incurs a cost to the owners, so they face a meaningful decision of how to pay dividends. 3 The downside of payouts is that reduced cash holdings lower the capability to cover any future losses. We start by assuming that the liquidity constraint is very stark in the sense that it is not possible to inject more cash into the …rm. In this case the …rm is forced to exit if it has no cash while facing a negative cash ‡ow. We later extend the model to the case where new funds may be raised at some transaction cost; the basic version can be thought of as a special case in which such transaction costs are prohibitive.
Unconstrained Firm
The unconstrained …rm will exit if the cash ‡ow becomes too negative. The value function V (x) gives the expected discounted future cash ‡ows for a …rm with current revenue level x t = x, and it is de…ned by the familiar di¤erential equation:
(see e.g. Dixit and Pindyck 1994, Chapter 7) with the constraints that V x be continuous ("smooth pasting") and have a …nite limit. This ODE has a well-known closed-form solution. The …rm exits when x t falls to x given by
The unconstrained value function is
Fully Constrained Firm
The constrained …rm has an initial cash balance s 0 that is exogenous to the problem.
Cash earns interest at rate r . At any moment t, the …rm can run down its cash balance by paying dividends. Paying dividends is costless and instantaneous. The objective of the …rm is to maximize the expected discounted stream of dividend payments. We denote by D := fD t g t 0 the cumulative dividend process. The restrictions that we impose on this process are the following. First, since we allow only positive dividend payments, the process must be increasing. Second, the dividend payment dD t at time t can only be conditioned on past history of cash- ‡ows. Stated in technical terms, D must be adapted to the …ltration generated by the Brownian motion fw t g t 0 . Third, we assume that D is right-continuous (upward jumps in D represent lumpy dividend payments). Finally, D must satisfy the liquidity constraint, which requires that s t 0 for all t, where the dynamics of the cash balance s t are given by:
The …rm is forced to exit if x t c and s t = 0, so the exit time is given by := inf ft 0 : x t c and s t = 0g :
The objective of the …rm is to choose a dividend process to maximize:
subject to (6), (7), and s t 0 for all t 2 [0; ]. Note that this formulation allows voluntary exit when x t < c and s t > 0 by paying out the remaining cash as the liquidation value: dD t = s t .
4
The …rm's problem becomes much more intuitive once recast as a Markovian control problem with suitably chosen state variables. Note that the history at time t consists of past cash ‡ows fx t 0 g 0 t 0 t , past dividends fD t 0 g 0 t 0 t , and the initial cash balance s 0 . Since the cash ‡ow process is Markovian, the part of the history that de…nes the probability distribution for future incomes is summarized in the current cash ‡ow level x t . Similarly, the part of the history that de…nes the …rm's capacity to satisfy the liquidity constraint is summarized as the current cash holdings s t , as derived from past cash ‡ows and dividend payments through equation (6).
Therefore, the pair (x t ; s t ) summarizes the history part that is payo¤ relevant for the future, and is su¢ cient for deciding the optimal policy at t by the Bellman's Principle of Optimality. Consequently, we may denote by V (x; s) the value of the …rm that solves (8) starting from an arbitrary state point (x 0 ; s 0 ) = (x; s).
In e¤ect, the problem of the …rm is to choose between three policy options at each point of the state space. First, the …rm may exit, which is irreversible, and results in the exit value s t . Second, the …rm may pay a positive dividend dD t to the owners, which shifts the …rm in the state space to cash balance level s t dD t . Third, the …rm can continue without paying dividends, in which case the cash balance evolves according to
The solution to the …rm's problem is a division of the (x; s) space into regions in each of which one of the three policy options is optimal. The following Proposition characterizes the solution in the case where r < (the special case r = will be discussed later). For illustration, see Figure 1 . The small gray region is a transitory region inside the continuation region.
Proposition 1 (Optimal policy when 0 r < ) There are constants x min 2 (x ; c),
x max > c, and s max > 0 such that the optimal policy has the following features:
1. If x t x min , it is optimal to exit immediately irrespective of s t .
2. If x min < x t < c, then there is a cut-o¤ value e s (x t ) > 0 such that it is optimal to exit if and only if s t e s (x t ). e s (x t ) is decreasing in x t and lim xt!c e s (x t ) = 0.
3. If x t c, it is optimal not to exit, irrespective of s t .
4. If x t > x max or s t > s max , it is strictly optimal to pay out some dividends (and
The proof is in Appendix A. Figure 1 illustrates the optimal policy. This is the key …gure of our paper. The life span of a …rm is a stochastic path in the (x; s)
space. While the …rm stays inside the continuation region its law of motion is given by equations (1) and (9). The gray area inside the continuation region is a transitory region: after leaving it, a …rm that follows the optimal policy cannot return there.
The …rm never ventures inside the dividend region, because payouts (which move the …rm down along s-axis) keep it from crossing the boundary of that region. When revenue x is su¢ ciently high, the dividend region reaches all the way to the s = 0 line, where the …rm operates with zero cash holdings and continually pays out all of the pro…t ‡ow as dividends. The …rm's life span ends when it hits the boundary of the exit region for the …rst time.
We will next explain the intuition for why the optimal policy takes the form depicted in Figure 1 .
Continuation Region
The point of accumulating cash is to use it as a bu¤er that prevents ine¢ cient exit.
To see this, consider a situation where the …rm's current cash holding s t is small but strictly positive, and where the pro…t ‡ow is exactly zero, i.e. x t = c. The …rm is not currently making losses and there is a positive option value associated with future pro…ts, so it cannot be optimal to exit. Neither can it be optimal to pay out s t as dividends, because this would cause the …rm to immediately move down to the point (x = c; s = 0), which means that the …rm is forced to exit within the "next instant" thus losing the option value. Therefore, there must be a non-empty continuation region, where it is optimal to retain cash inside the …rm despite the di¤erence between the discount rate and the rate of return on cash holdings. Now let's consider the properties of the value function in the continuation region.
De…ne the value of the constrained …rm V (x; s) as gross of the cash holdings, so the value at the time of exit is V (x; s) = s. Using Ito's lemma, we can write the di¤erential dV as:
Taking the expectation and letting dt be small yields:
where ds is from (9). The Bellman equation is
which can be solved for V dt = E (dV ), leading to the following PDE:
Note that this PDE does not contain a cash ‡ow term. The reason is that, in the continuation region, the cash ‡ow between the …rm and its owners is zero: Positive cash ‡ow adds to the cash balance and negative ‡ow subtracts from it.
The PDE (11) does not have a closed-form solution. Further, it is valid only in the continuation region, the boundaries of which must be optimally chosen as part of the solution. We will next discuss the properties of these boundaries, which constitute the optimal exit and dividend policies. The numerical solution of the problem is discussed in Section 3.
Exit Policy
The liquidity constraint can only reduce the continuation value of the …rm, so the constrained …rm should certainly exit whenever the unconstrained would, i.e., when
In addition, the …rm is forced to exit when it has no cash to cover the current loss, i.e., when (x t c; s t = 0). This gives a …xed boundary for the value of the …rm:
The …rm should clearly never exit while current pro…ts are positive (x t > c). Now consider a …rm with a very small s t and with x t < c. This …rm is depleting its cash but could in principle still continue. However, it is very likely to be forced to exit in the near future. For any x t < c, and for su¢ ciently small s t , the …rm is so unlikely to bounce back to a positive cash ‡ow before s hits zero that the owners are better o¤ exiting immediately and just taking the remaining s t . 5 Thus, there must be a boundary between exit and continuation regions that lies strictly above s = 0 for x < c. We call exiting when x t > x and s t > 0 precautionary exit.
We denote the exit threshold bys (x), de…ned in x 2 [x min ; c] where x min is, in practical terms, the lowest revenue at which the …rm ever operates. The lower is x t , the less valuable the continuation value of the …rm, and thus the higher the s required for continuation to be optimal, sos 0 (x) < 0 in x 2 (x min ; c).
Inside the continuation region the value of the …rm must exceed the exit value s.
At the exit boundary the …rm is indi¤erent between taking the exit value and the continuation value, so
Inside the continuation region the marginal value of cash must be at least unity, else the owners would be better o¤ by paying out cash. Smooth pasting at the exit boundary requires
It may seem unintuitive that the exit boundary is strictly above zero for all x < c.
To see this point more formally, suppose, by contrast, that the continuation region in fact reached all the way down to s = 0 for some interval [x 0 ; c], where x 0 < c. Since a cashless …rm is forced to exit at s = 0, the boundary value V (x; 0) = 0 is …xed for all x c. This implies that the …rst and second derivatives with respect to x must also be zero within this interval: V x (x; 0) = V xx (x; 0) = 0 for all x 2 (x 0 ; c). Substituting these into the PDE (11) that holds in the continuation region yields V s (x; 0) = 0 within this interval. But this leads to a contradiction, because V s 1 must hold in the continuation region, or else cash would be more valuable outside than inside the …rm. It follows that the continuation region cannot reach down to s = 0 for x < c.
The only way in which a …rm following the optimal policy can extinguish all funds is to hit exactly the zero- ‡ow-zero-stock point for cash, fx t ; s t g = fc; 0g. Thus the constrained …rm will experience a forced exit with probability 0. 6 Practically all exit by liquidity constrained …rms is precautionary.
We assume that the scrap value of the …rm is zero, so the exit value of the …rm is simply equal to its cash holdings. In the unconstrained case, adding a positive scrap value would be equivalent to adding the rental opportunity cost of the scrap value to the ‡ow cost. However, in the presence of a liquidity constraint an opportunity cost is not equivalent to an operating cost as only the latter requires liquidity. In the extreme, having a scrap value so high that the optimal exit threshold of an unconstrained …rm is positive, the …rm cannot face negative cash ‡ows during its lifetime so the liquidity constraint is redundant. Apart from this extreme case, the problem would not be qualitatively changed by a positive scrap value.
Dividend Policy
When r < , holding cash is costly. The bene…t of holding cash is that it may allow the …rm to avoid a forced exit in the future when the option value of continuation would still be positive. This bene…t is bounded above by V (c), the unconstrained continuation value at the zero pro…t ‡ow. Since the cost of holding cash increases without bound in s, there exists, for any x, some s high enough such that it is better to stop accumulating cash. This threshold value, denotedŝ(x), de…nes the boundary between the continuation region and the dividend region. It can be interpreted as a target level of cash holdings that depends on current pro…tability. The …rm makes payouts to owners to make sure it doesn't hold more than the target level of cash;
hence we callŝ the dividend threshold. The value of the …rm above the dividend threshold must be:
For su¢ ciently high x the possibility of forced exit is so remote that it is not worth holding on to any cash. We denote the threshold above which it is optimal to not hold any cash by x max . In the limit x ! 1, the prospect of forced exit becomes irrelevant, and thus the value of the …rm must converge to the value of the unconstrained:
At the dividend threshold, cash is equally valuable inside as it is outside the …rm, where one dollar is of course worth one dollar. Thus, the value matching condition
must hold at the dividend threshold. The associated smooth-pasting condition re-
The …rm is constrained at the margin only in the continuation region; there having a dollar more would increase the value of the …rm by more than a dollar: V s (x; s) > 1.
When the …rm hits the dividend threshold from inside it pays out just enough cash to not cross the boundary. However, if the …rm were to start at s 0 >ŝ(x 0 ), then it would immediately pay out the excess s 0 ŝ(x 0 ) as a lump sum dividend. (For a new …rm this means that the owners have more than enough funds to endow the …rm with the optimal level of precautionary cash holdings; the "lump dividend" at the start is then the cash that owners retain for themselves.) A lump sum dividend is also paid out as the liquidation value upon precautionary exit. Note that if a …rm that enters the industry at revenue level x 0 can choose its initial cash holdings then s 0 =ŝ(x 0 ) is the optimal choice.
Comparative Statics
We next illustrate how the …rm's optimal policy depends on the parameters of the stochastic process. To do this, we solve the optimal policy numerically in a manner to be explained in Section 3. We vary one parameter at a time from a set of baseline parameters. The results are depicted in Figure 2 . The solid lines mark the borders of the continuation region in the liquidity constrained case, and the vertical dashed lines mark the optimal exit threshold in the unconstrained case. The left panel shows the relation of the optimal policy and , the volatility of the cash ‡ow process. As is well known, the unconstrained exit threshold x is decreasing in . Here the increased option value shows up as an enlarged continuation region. As in the unconstrained case, higher volatility makes it optimal to accept bigger losses because it increases the upside potential while the downside is still protected by the exit option. Furthermore, the dividend boundary shifts out to the right also because, at any given x, higher volatility increases the risk of facing forced exit within any given period of time.
The right panel of Figure 2 shows the e¤ect of varying , the percentage drift of the cash ‡ow process. Higher increases the option value at any given level of losses, as the …rm is more likely to bounce back to positive pro…ts within any given period of time. However, higher also makes the …rm safer at any given point-by making it less likely that forced exit would threaten it within any given time-so it is not obvious that a higher should also shift out the dividend boundary. However, we have found no examples of the opposite. 
Special Case: No Liquidity Premium (r = )
Consider now the special case in which there is no liquidity premium: r = . Hoarding cash is now costless, so it can never be strictly optimal to pay dividends. The optimal policy is thus de…ned by dividing the (x; s) space between the exit region and the continuation region. The qualitative properties of the exit region and the exit thresholds (x) are the same as with r < .
Holding cash inside the …rm can be strictly optimal only when there is a positive probability of being forced to exit in the future. Of course, no matter how high x t , falling below x always remains possible. However, the worst-case cash ‡ow under which the owners would ever want to continue is the cash ‡ow at the unconstrained exit policy, x c. The …rm becomes irreversibly unconstrained if it accumulates so much cash that the interest income from its cash holdings could be used to cover the worst-case losses forever. This de…nes the escape level of cash as
This means that a …xed boundary condition
now replaces the free boundaryŝ(x) seen in the r < case. For s t s , the …rm is indi¤erent between paying dividends or not and V (x; s) = V (x) + s. Above the escape level of cash, the …rm can no longer run out of cash before …rst becoming so unpro…table that it would want to exit even in the absence of a liquidity constraint.
As the …rm is then in e¤ect unconstrained, its exit policy is the same as that of an unconstrained …rm: exit if and only if x x . We summarize these results in the following proposition:
Proposition 2 (Optimal policy when 0 r = ) If x t > x and s t < (c x ) =r, it is strictly optimal to refrain from paying dividends. If x t > x and s t > (c x ) =r, the owners are indi¤erent between paying dividends and continuing without paying dividends. The optimal exit policy is qualitatively the same as when r < (see
Proposition 1).
The special case without a liquidity premium is quite similar to the setup of a …nancially constrained …rm in Mello and Parsons (2000) . They study optimal hedging, namely how …rms should use futures contracts on an asset that is correlated with their pro…ts to reduce the risk of ine¢ cient exit. They do not take into account that the …rm becomes permanently safe from ine¢ cient exit at a …nite level of cash holdings, but instead assume that the constrained …rm's value reaches that of the unconstrained case only in the limit of in…nite cash holdings. The environment faced by the agent in DeMarzo and Sannikov (2008) also features serially correlated cash ‡ow and saving is possible without liquidity costs; there precautionary exit does not arise because expected cash ‡ow is assumed to be always positive (due to a parameter restriction which implies that the exit threshold is always positive). There is also no liquidity premium in the model of Gryglewicz (2011) , so it is never strictly optimal to pay out dividends. To generate predictions about the dividend policy he assumes that the …rm pays dividends at the indi¤erence boundary, which is equivalent to our s (but is changing over time due to learning).
Small Liquidity Cost
It turns out that the optimal policy, in particular the dividend policy, is very sensitive to small liquidity costs. Figure 3 shows the impact of varying the return on …rm's cash holdings, r. As r gets closer to it becomes less costly to hold cash so continuation is everywhere more attractive and the continuation region expands. The limiting case results in the escape level of cash s , from (20), that is much higher than the highest cash holdings that the …rm would ever keep even at a liquidity premium of just one basis point. The limiting case is qualitatively di¤erent, because there is no trade-o¤ between the liquidity cost of the cash holdings and the expected bene…t of preventing exit. 8 However, while the optimal payout policy is very sensitive to r near , the value of the …rm is not. When r is very close to the liquidity cost is negligible, and there is a large region in state space where the …rm is almost indi¤erent between retaining and paying out cash. (There the marginal value of cash, V s , is only very slightly above unity). The high sensitivity of optimal policy to r near means that, even if the liquidity premium were close to zero, the optimal behavior of …rms would not be well approximated with a model where the liquidity cost is completely assumed away.
Generalization: New Cash Injections
The assumption that the …rm can not raise new cash is quite stark, and is made in order to identify the e¤ects of the liquidity constraint in its most transparent form.
Here we generalize the model to the case where owners can increase the …rm's cash 8 It can be shown that as the optimal policy converges to the limiting case as r " , in the sense that, for every point (x 0 ; s 0 < s ) in the continuation region of the limiting case r = , there exists r 0 < for which (x 0 ; s 0 ) is in the continuation region. Paying the transaction cost can only be optimal when the …rm would otherwise face immediate forced exit (s = 0 and x < 0) because otherwise the cost could still be postponed and, with luck, even avoided. If the …rm decides to incur the transaction cost, then its target level of cash is
The target level s + equalizes the marginal cost of new cash and its marginal value at the …rm, V s (x; s + (x)) = 1 + . Transaction costs are independent of current revenue x, so raising cash must be more desirable the higher the current x (as long as x < 0).
Therefore, if raising cash is ever optimal, then there must be some x (1 + ) s + = 0.
If transaction costs are su¢ ciently high then it is never optimal for the …rm to raise new cash. This is the case when max s fV (0; s) (1 + ) s g 0, i.e., the …rm's value net the transaction cost would be negative. Notice that "prohibitive" transaction costs are …nite, because the bene…t (from some probability of ine¢ cient exit prevented) is necessarily …nite.
We describe in Section 3 how the optimal policy with new cash injections can be solved numerically. Figure 4 depicts the optimal policy for a …rm that faces positive but not prohibitive transaction costs. The qualitative di¤erence to the optimal policy in the basic model (recall Figure 1) is the segment of horizontal axis where cash is raised and the associated target curve s + (x) directly above. For su¢ ciently low cash ‡ow the …rm still …nds it optimal to exit with positive cash holdings rather than incur the transaction cost.
Holding cash is costly when r < , so without a …xed transaction cost …rms would raise cash continuously only to o¤set a contemporaneous negative cash ‡ow. The …xed cost makes it is optimal to raise new cash in lumps in order to postpone the prospects of having to incur it again. In the absence of a marginal transaction cost it would be optimal to "jump" all the way to the dividend boundary. Any transaction costs reduce the value of continuation and shift the exit boundary to the right.
The unconstrained case, with the simple exit threshold x in (3), is the limiting case where both the …xed and the marginal transaction cost are zero. The constrained case, where the …rm never raises new cash, is equivalent to assuming that the cost parameters are prohibitively high. Hence this setup encompasses both the constrained and unconstrained cases of the basic model.
The setup with cash injections allows various interpretations. One literal interpretation is that of a risk-neutral owner-entrepreneur who allocates her wealth between two assets; one liquid asset that can be used to pay o¤ possible losses, and another illiquid asset that yields a higher rate of return but can only be turned into liquid form at a transaction cost. The entrepreneur has deep pockets in terms of the illiquid asset, but the transaction cost makes it desirable to hold some liquid assets as well and, in some circumstances, let the …rm fold rather than incur another transaction 
cost.
A broad interpretation of the extended model analyzed in this section is a …rm that can raise new equity at a transaction cost. This interpretation is similar to Décamps et al (2011) who analyze the case of non-persistent cash ‡ow risk. Assuming that there is a …xed cost associated with raising equity, the …rm delays the recapitalization until it has used up its liquid assets. Then, upon hitting fs = 0; x 2 [x + min ; 0]g, it will raise new equity in order to increase its cash balance to level s + (x) that equalizes the marginal value of internal cash with the marginal cost of raising equity. The new owners supply the …rm with cash and are compensated with an equally valuable stake in the …rm. Our calibrated example of industry equilibrium in Section 4.2 will adhere to this interpretation of the …rm's problem.
Comparative Statics
In Figure 5 , we illustrate how the level of transaction costs a¤ects the optimal policy.
In addition to the case with prohibitive transaction parameters (seen already in Figure 1 ), we solve the policy for a case of low and high transaction costs. In each case the exit boundary is further left than under prohibitive costs, as the threat of forced exit is not as grave with the possibility to raise new capital. The lower the transaction costs, the further the exit boundary shifts towards the unconstrained exit threshold.
With low transaction costs it is cheap to add cash whenever necessary, so it is possible to reduce the liquidity cost and never hold very much cash, so the continuation region becomes smaller. In the limiting case the …rm holds no cash; it pays out pro…ts as they come in, and raises cash as it makes losses. 
Solution Method
The PDE de…ned by (11) and the various free boundary conditions cannot be solved analytically. To solve the …rm's problem we turn to a discrete-time approximation of the problem and solve it numerically. 9 In the binomial process approximation of 9 The program for solving the optimal policy is available at http://www.hse-econ.…/murto.
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geometric Brownian motion the evolution of x is governed by x (t + ) = 
where , the length of the time period, can be set arbitrarily small. 10 The evolution of the cash balance is now
where (t) 2 [0; s (t)] is the dividend paid at time t. The dividend cannot be so high as to make the cash holdings negative at any point in time, so the maximum feasible dividend is restricted by min fs (t + ) ; s (t)g 0, where s (t)
The value function of the …rm, stated in recursive form, is
where s (t + ) is from (25).
The recursion in (26) satis…es Blackwell's su¢ cient conditions so it is a contraction mapping. Thus it can be solved by iterating backwards in time: Starting from an arbitrary V T (x; sjT ) the value function converges to a unique solution that approximates V (x; s).
11
Augmenting the value function with the additional option of raising more cash is straightforward. When solving for the optimal policy, (26) is replaced with
where s (t + ) is from (25). The numerical solution method is otherwise unchanged.
Industry Equilibrium
We saw in Section 2 how a liquidity constraint causes …rms to exit at higher levels of current revenue compared to unconstrained …rms. It might therefore seem obvious that, at the level of an entire industry, the liquidity constraint would cause there to be fewer but on average more productive …rms. However, as we next show, this …rm-level reasoning is misleading, because it does not take into account the impact that the liquidity constraint has on output price in competitive equilibrium.
In order to analyze the impact of the liquidity constraint on a competitive industry, we use the de…nition of industry equilibrium similar to Hopenhayn (1992) and Dixit and Pindyck (1994, Ch 8.4) . 12 There is a continuum of …rms. We assume that for each …rm the revenue x depends on …rm-speci…c output or "productivity" z and an endogenous industry-speci…c output price p, so that
We assume that productivity z follows geometric Brownian motion
with the shocks dw t independent across …rms. New …rms of known productivity z 0 can be established by paying an entry cost . Entering …rms choose the initial level of cash holdings to maximize value, so that s 0 = s + (x 0 ), where s + is from (22). (In the fully constrained case s 0 would have to be an exogenous parameter.) To guarantee the existence of steady state, we assume an exogenous "death rate" > at which …rms are forced to exit with their cash holdings as the exit value (see Appendix B for details). 13 In steady state, both the dying and the endogenously exiting …rms must be balanced by an equal in ‡ow of new …rms of type fz 0 ; s 0 g.
The industry faces a demand curve D(p) for its output. We assume that the demand curve is everywhere strictly downward sloping. The equilibrating variables 12 Liquidity constraints are introduced to a similar steady-state setting by Gomes (2001) to study the relation of cash ‡ow and investment, and by Cooley and Quadrini (2001) to study the ageconditional relation of growth and …rm size. Jones (2003) averages over simulated time series of individual …rms to study the impact of liquidity constraints on the propagation of aggregate shocks. 13 The risk of exogenous exit changes the …rm's optimal policy slightly compared to Section 2: the …rms discount the future at rate + instead of and the Bellman equation of the constrained …rm includes a term s on the right hand side of (11).
are price of output p and mass of …rms m. Firms are atomistic, so there is no aggregate uncertainty in steady state. As p is constant, the revenue of individual …rms (28) follows the same process (1) that we assumed earlier in Section 2. All …rms follow the same optimal policy, which in turn results in a stationary distribution of z. In steady state, m and p must satisfy market clearing
where z denotes the cross-sectional average output of …rms in steady state ( z depends on p because the exit policy in terms of z depends on p). Entry is endogenous, so equilibrium must also satisfy the zero-pro…t condition for entering …rms
where the total entry cost includes …nancing costs for both the "physical"entry cost and the initial level of cash holdings s + .
14 Equilibrium price is fully determined by the entry condition (31): p must adjust to eliminate expected rents to entrants. (If entry were pro…table then more …rms would enter and m would increase, and if entry resulted in expected loss then no one would enter and m would decrease.) Since the value function V is increasing in revenue, p is uniquely determined by (31) and V is obtained numerically as described in the previous section. In the unconstrained case the entry condition (31) is replaced by V (pz 0 ) = , where V has the closed form seen in (5).
For any p, the mass of …rms is determined from (30) as m = D(p)= z (p). The role of m is merely to close the model. We are not interested in the number of …rms but rather on the cross-sectional distribution of productivity, which is independent of m and of the shape of the demand curve because the model has, at industry-level, constant returns to scale. 15 Thus m and D will not feature in our analysis. 
Survival of the Fattest
The model assumes perfect competition, so the only component of welfare that can be a¤ected by the liquidity constraint is consumer surplus, which varies in the opposite 14 Note that entry, unlike recapitalization, may take place at a positive level of revenue. 15 A doubling of entry ‡ow doubles the steady state industry output. 16 For a more detailed exposition of this industry equilibrium concept, see Miao (2005) , who studies capital structure (in the absence of liquidity constraints). direction as p. Maximum welfare is, of course, attained in the unconstrained case, so the liquidity constraint can only increase p. In real terms, there are potentially three di¤erent components to the price distortion: higher aggregate entry cost (due to higher turnover), lower average productivity, and higher liquidity costs. As it turns out, turnover and productivity can move to either direction.
Figure 6: Liquidity constraint and average productivity in industry equilibrium.
To understand why the impact of the liquidity constraint on mean productivity is ambiguous, consider, for simplicity, the fully constrained case where there are no cash injections. Suppose that the entering …rms have no cash holdings (s 0 = 0). The position of …rms in (z; s)-space is illustrated in Figure 6 . Entry level z 0 is at the point to the right of the zero-pro…t level (z = c=p) where the continuation value matches the entry cost. As price is distorted upwards, the lowest type to ever continue (z min )
is below the unconstrained exit threshold (z ), even though the associated revenue level is higher (Recall x min > x in Figure 1 ). The higher price makes it optimal for …rms with su¢ cient cash reserves to continue at productivity levels that would trigger exit in the unconstrained world. The light shaded region (ine¢ cient survival) covers …rms that would exit in the unconstrained solution but stay in under the liquidity constraint. The dark region (ine¢ cient exit) covers …rms that are more productive than the unconstrained exit threshold z but exit due to the liquidity constraint.
Whether mean productivity is increased or decreased by a liquidity constraint depends on which of these two e¤ects dominates. 17 In the working paper version of this paper we analyze numerically how the steady state outcomes vary in z 0 and s 0 and show that mean productivity is decreased when the entry cost is su¢ ciently low (see Murto and Terviö, 2010 ). Here we instead move to a calibrated example with cash injections.
A Calibrated Example
We now present a quantitative example based on the general model with cash injections, using the transaction cost parameters estimated by Hennessy and Whited (2007) with U.S. data. They estimated that (…nancial companies excluded) the marginal cost of raising new equity is = 0:09 and the …xed cost of recapitalization is = $59; 800. 18 We take most parameters from Miao (2010) , who also models the …rm revenue process as a geometric Brownian motion. Speci…cally, we set the drift = 0:0075; volatility = 0:15; the exogenous …rm death rate = 0:04, and the discount rate = 0:0525. We set the liquidity premium at r = 0:01, the same as used by Décamps et al (2011) , which results in r = 0:0425:
We are left with the …xed operating cost c and entry cost . We aim to choose these parameters so as to match a …rm turnover rate of 0:07 and the recapitalization rate of 0:175. We take the turnover rate from Miao (2010) and the recapitalization rate is estimated by Hennessy and Whited (2007) . We aim to choose the …xed operating cost c and entry cost in order to match the …rm turnover and recapitalization rates with the targets. To do this, we calculate the steady state …rm distributions for a wide range of combinations c and . This is done by …rst solving numerically the optimal …rm policy (as explained in Section 3). The steady state distribution is then obtained by iterating the …rm distribution according to this policy until the distribution converges (see Appendix B for more details). Various statistics including turnover rate and recapitalization rate are then readily computed from the steady state distribution.
17 If s 0 is su¢ ciently high and not too high then z 0 2 (z ; c=p) and the picture is more complicated, as some of ine¢ ciently exiting …rms are replaced by less productive …rms. 18 Hennessy and Whited estimate the costs separately for small and large …rms, as well as for the total population of non-…nancial …rms. In our model, small …rms can become large and vice versa, so we use their results for the total population. Figure 7 depicts the contours of our calibration targets in the space of endogenously determined parameters (entry cost , operation cost c). Holding …xed c, equilibrium turnover (lighter contours) is decreasing in ; this is natural as is from the economy's point of view a cost of replacing underperforming …rms with new ones. Less obviously, the recapitalization rate (black contours) is also decreasing in , even though a higher entry cost makes recapitalization more attractive relative to "replacing" the entire …rm. However, higher entry cost also implies a higher equilibrium price of output, so entering …rms (whose productivity is exogenous) are more pro…table and thus less likely to need a recapitalization.
The shapes of the target curves make it clear that there is a unique match ( ; c ).
To understand why this is so, consider for a moment scaling up all cost parameters ( and c, as well as transaction costs and ). Such a change would amount to scaling of monetary units, so equilibrium price would also be scaled by the same factor. In ( ; c)-space space such scaling amounts to moving along a ray from the origin, so turnover rate would be constant along any ray. However, in the calibration, transaction cost parameters are …xed, so while moving out on a ray from the origin recapitalization becomes relatively cheaper. This explains why contours of recapitalization rate bend downwards so that the recapitalization rate is higher further out from the origin on any ray. Recapitalizing an existing …rm and replacing it with a new …rm (turnover)
are substitutes from welfare point of view. Turnover contours bend in upwards so the turnover rate is decreasing along a …xed ray from the origin. As seen in the …gure, this implies exactly one point where both targets are matched at the same time.
The unique match of the calibration targets is at = 0:48, c = 0:12. This implies a …xed one-time entry cost of $480:000, and a yearly …xed cost of $120; 000.
In interpreting these …gures, note that we do not explicitly model inputs such as labor and physical capital. The revenue is best interpreted as describing revenue net of adjustable inputs under a constant returns to scale production technology.
Having calibrated the model, we calculate other steady state outcomes at the calibrated parameter values. To quantify the impact of …nancial frictions, we also calculate the corresponding distributions in the absence of transactions costs (see Appendix B for details). The top row of Table 1 reports the key …gures. Equilibrium output price is 7:2% higher than in the absence of transaction costs. Resulting average productivity is 3:6% higher than in the absence of transaction costs. Thus, at the calibrated parameters, the productivity-enhancing e¤ect of excessive "weeding out" is stronger than the "survival of the fattest". 19 As the model has perfect competition, the increase in output price paid by the consumers represents the welfare loss from …nancial frictions.
Finally, we look at the robustness of the industry outcomes with respect to our key parameters. First, we replace the transaction cost parameters taken from Hennessy and Whited (2007) Table 1 . We see that theses parameters imply somewhat higher entry and operating costs, while the 19 We …nd that this is reversed if entry cost is set su¢ ciently low, but this implies turnover rates that are too high to be consistent with this data.
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price impact is lower, 4:8%. Second, we investigate how changing the liquidity premium r a¤ects the results by repeating the calibration exercise with r = 0:475 (low liquidity premium) and r = 0 (high liquidity premium 
Conclusion
We have analyzed the problem of a liquidity constrained …rm that faces persistent cash ‡ow uncertainty. We view our model as a natural framework for analyzing how pro…tability and liquidity jointly a¤ect the …rm's exit and payout policies, and how liquidity constraint distorts production at the industry level. We abstract away from some important aspects of …rm dynamics such as growth options, agency issues, and choice of …nancing structure. We are hopeful that our model framework proves useful for future work along these lines.
Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 1
Preliminaries. We begin by three lemmas that collect together the key properties of V (x; s) utilized in the proof. The …rst one merely records properties of V (x; s) that are discussed in more detail in Section 2.2 of the main text:
Lemma 1 V (x; s) is continuous and increasing in both arguments, and V (x; s) s for all (x; s). Depending on the optimal policy at (x; s):
If it is optimal to exit, then V (x; s) = s.
If it is optimal to continue without paying dividends, then V (x; s) > s, V s (x; s) > 1, and the following partial di¤erential equation holds locally at (x; s):
If it is optimal to pay dividends and continue thereafter, then V (x; s) > s and
Proof. Choosing dividend dD t = s t and exiting immediately thereafter is a feasible policy at every point in state space and gives value s t . It follows immediately that V (x; s) s for all (x; s). In particular V (x; s) = s whenever it is optimal to exit and V (x; s) > s whenever it is strictly optimal to continue. The application of Bellman's principle and Ito's lemma imply that if it is optimal to continue without paying dividends, then the value function must satisfy the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation (32) locally at (x; s), and V s (x; s) > 1 (see Section 2.2 in the main text).
Finally, if it is optimal to pay a positive dividend dD > 0 and continue thereafter, the principle of dynamic programming gives V (x; s) = dD + V (x; s dD), which implies that V s (x; s 0 ) = 1 for all s 0 2 [s dD; s]. Continuity and monotonicity of V (x; s)
follow from the properties of state transition dynamics and monotonicity of cash ‡ow with respect to x.
Lemma 2 establishes lower and upper bounds for V (x; s):
Lemma 2 For all (x; s), we have
where
and where V (x) is given by (5) and is given by (4) in the main text. with the boundary condition V (c) = 0 is given by (34). Since this policy is feasible, it gives a lower bound for the value of the optimally managed …rm. On the other hand, the net value of a …rm that faces no liquidity constraint is V (x), and this must be an upper bound for the liquidity constrained …rm.
Finally, Lemma 3 states that a …rm that is at the edge of being pro…table (x t = c)
is more valuable to its owners than its cash holdings. This lemma guarantees that positive cash holdings are optimal at least under some conditions:
Lemma 3 V (c; s) > s for all s > 0.
Proof. The key to this result is the kink in the value function V (x) at x = c.
Take an arbitrary s > 0, and let x t = c, s t = s. Take a sequence f n g 1 n=1 such that lim n!1 n = 0 and n > 0 for each n. Denote by V n the expected payo¤ of a feasible (but suboptimal) policy, according to which the …rm continues without paying dividends for a period of length n , and thereafter pays out all incoming cash:
Since x t is a geometric Brownian motion, we have:
Standard properties of Normal distribution imply:
Since Normal distribution is symmetric around its mean, we have
20 Note that s t > 0 and x t c = 0, so that the …rm is not under threat of immediate forced exit.
Therefore, as we consider short intervals n , we can safely ignore the possibility that s t 0 = 0 for some t 0 2 [0; n ].
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where o ( n ) denotes terms that go to zero at least linearly in n . Denoting by the derivative from right of V (x) at the kink:
and noting that
we have
Therefore, for n large enough, V n > s t . But since the optimal policy is at least weakly better than this strategy, we have V (c; s t ) V n for any n, and it follows that V (c; s t ) > s t .
Proof of Proposition 1
Part 1: We want to show that there is some x 0 > x such that stopping is optimal for all x x 0 , s 0. Suppose the contrary. Then we can …nd a sequence fx n ; s n g 1 n=1 with x n > x for all n, lim n!1 s n = s > 0 and lim n!1 x n = x , such that all points (x n ; s n ) are within the continuation region so that (32) holds by Lemma 1. 21 Since V (x ) = 0, it follows from Lemma 2 that V (x ; s) = s for all s. Therefore V (x n ; s n ) ! s n and V s (x n ; s n ) ! 1 as n ! 1. By the smooth-pasting condition of the unconstrained …rm, we have V x (x ) = 0, and therefore we must have
(Otherwise we would have either V (x n ; s n ) < s n or V (x n ; s n ) > V (x n ) + s n for n large enough, hence violating Lemma 2.)
Since (32) must hold at all points in the sequence fx n ; s n g 1 n=1 , we have:
On the other hand, from the corresponding Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation of the unconstrained …rm (equation (2) in the main paper) we have
and therefore
But since V (x n ; s n ) ! V (x ) + s n and V x (x n ; s n ) ! V x (x ), this implies that V (x n ; s n ) > V (x n ) + s n for n large enough. This is a contradiction with Lemma 2.
We can conclude that V (x; s) = s for all s for some x > x . We let
Part 2: By Lemma 3, we have V (c; s) > s for all s > 0. It follows from continuity of the value function that V (c "; s t ) > s t for some " > 0, so that x min de…ned in (35) satis…es x min < c.
Next, we show that for all x 2 (x min ; c), there is some s 0 > 0 such that V (x; s) = s for all s s 0 . Suppose, by contrast, that there is some x 0 2 (x min ; c) such that V (x 0 ; s) > s for all s > 0. Since V (x; s) is increasing in x, this implies that V (x; s) > s for all x 2 (x 0 ; c), s > 0. Therefore, there is a continuation region that reaches all the way down to s = 0 for the interval (x 0 ; c), and by Lemma 1, (32) must hold for all s su¢ ciently small. However, since a cashless …rm is forced to exit at s = 0 for x < c, the boundary condition V (x; 0) = 0 must hold for the whole interval, and therefore also V x (x; 0) = V xx (x; 0) = 0 for all x 2 (x 0 ; c). Substituting these into (32) yields V s (x; 0) = 0 for x 2 (x 0 ; c). But since V (x; s) s for all (x; s) by Lemma 1, this is a contradiction. It follows that V (x; s) = s for all x 2 (x min ; c) and for all s s 0 for some s 0 > 0. De…ne for all x 2 (x min ; c): e s (x) := max fs jV (x; s) = s g .
It remains to show that e s (x t ) is decreasing in x t and lim xt!c e s (x t ) = 0. The former property follows from the monotonicity of V (x; s) in x: suppose on the contrary that e s (x 00 ) > e s (x 0 ) for some x 00 > x 0 . But then, V (x 0 ; e s (x 00 )) > s = V (x 00 ; e s (x 00 )) which violates the property that V (x; s) is increasing in x. The latter property follows from the continuity of V (x; s): suppose that there is some s 0 > 0 such that e s (x) > s 0 for all
x in some open neighborhood of c. But this means that V (x; s) = s for all 0 < s < s 0 when x is arbitrarily close to c, and this is in contradiction with continuity of V (x; s) and our previous …nding that V (c; s) > s for all s > 0.
Part 3: One available (non-optimal) policy is to pay-out all incoming cash and keep cash balance at s t = 0. When x > c, this policy gives value V (x) + s > s, so it cannot be optimal to exit.
Part 4: Fix s > 0, and suppose that it is not optimal to pay dividends even at high values of x so that (32) holds for all x. Let x ! 1. From equation (5) which is a contradiction because we have > r and s > 0. It follows that the continuation region must be bounded from the right: it is optimal to pay dividends for high enough x. We let x max := inf fx > c jV (x; s) = V (x; 0) + s for all s 0g :
Finally, …x x > x min and suppose that it is not optimal to pay dividends even at high values of s. But then, as s ! 1, it follows from (32) that xV x (x; s) + 2 2 x 2 V xx (x; s) ! 1:
But this is in contradiction with (33) holding for all x and s, and the fact that V x (x), V xx (x), V x (x), and V xx (x) are all bounded and independent of s. We can therefore conclude that the continuation region must be bounded from above: it is optimal to pay dividends for high enough s. We let In the unconstrained case, the steady-state …rm distribution and its properties reported in Section 4 can be derived analytically as follows. Denote y log z. The exit threshold is y = log z and new …rms are born at y 0 > y . Taking a discrete time approximation, y follows the binomial process:
y (t + ) = ( y (t) + y with probability q y (t) y with probability 1 q where is the length of a period, q = 
There is no economically sensible steady state unless z = e y has a …nite mean.
Here R 1 y 0 e y f (y) dy < 1 is a necessary and a su¢ cient condition for the …nite mean.
Taking out the terms that are independent of y in (37), the …nite mean requirement 
This holds if 2 2 < 0, which simpli…es to > .
Constrained Case
The stationarity proof in the unconstrained case is su¢ cient for the stationarity of the distribution of z in the constrained process. As s is endogenously bounded by the optimal dividend policy and, …rm by …rm, depends deterministically on the history of z, the fact that z has a stationary distribution su¢ ces for the stationarity of the joint distribution (z; s). However, now the optimal policy has no closed-form solution so the steady state distribution must be computed numerically. In the discrete time approximation the life span of each individual …rm is a Markov chain in the discretized state space. Therefore, the steady state distribution is obtained by …rst computing the optimal policy of an individual …rm, and then, starting from some initial …rm distribution, iterating the …rm distribution according to the state transition equations associated with the policy (where a constant mass of new …rms are established at the birth point within each iteration) until the …rm distribution converges to the steady state.
